The 2025 presidential elections in Abkhazia: a turning point in Abkhazian-Russian relations?
On 1 March 2025, Abkhazia elected a new president, the 6th since de facto independence in 1992. Over the years, power has shifted between position and opposition. In this sense, this de facto state, fails to follow the example of its patron, Russia, where there has been no transfer of power to an opposition candidate since the fall of communism, each new president has been the handpicked successor of the outgoing incumbent. Indeed, with its relative political pluralism, Abkhazia scores higher on Freedom House’s Democracy Index than all other de facto states in Eurasia and higher than in even many recognized states.
This does not mean that Abkhazia is a model democracy. There are at least two worrying aspects of its political system. First, politics is monopolized by the titular group, the ethnic Abkhazians. The parliament is packed with members of this ethnic group, and it is stipulated in the constitution that the president must be an ethnic Abkhazian. Second, the political culture has a strong element of ochlocracy (mob rule). “The parliament of the street” is a factor to be reckoned with. The opposition has time and again mobilized huge, often violent rallies to protest against the government’s policies. They have frequently been successful: the three last presidents were all chased from office before their time was up. Such was also the prelude to the March 2025 elections. President Aslan Bzhania had been democratically elected in 2020 and was due to remain in office until 2025, but fled the country when a rowdy mob forced its way into the government building on 15 November 2024.
Brewing tensions in Abkhazian-Russian relations
There may be many reasons why no political faction in Abkhazia has been able to consolidate power and establish an autocracy, but one crucial factor is clearly relations with its patron, Russia. The Abkhazians fiercely guard their independence but at the same time are completely dependent upon support from Russia, and the Abkhazian government is under constant pressure from two sides, from the populace and from the patron. Time and again they have succumbed to this double pressure.
Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia in 2008 and is the only state in the region to have done so. With regard to both the economy and security, Abkhazia is utterly dependent upon Russian support. Russia covers up to half of Abkhazia’s state budget and also pays pensions to all retired people who hold Russian passports (which, with the exception of ethnic Georgians, virtually everyone does). Russia also subsidizes the salaries of teachers, doctors and other state employees in Abkhazia.
Image: On the Russia’s border to Abkhazia. Banner “200 years together” reminds visitors about patron-client relations (Source: ISPI)
Moscow clearly feels that it is reasonable to expect that it gets something in return, and first and foremost, it wants Russian citizens to have the right to buy property in Abkhazia. Abkhazia is located on the Black Sea coast with beaches that can be developed into lucrative tourist enterprises. Russian citizens are allowed to invest in commercial undertakings in Abkhazia, but not to buy houses. After the devastations in the war against Georgia in 1992/1993, there is still a dearth of residential houses, and the Abkhazians fear that if Russians were allowed to purchase real estate, prices would soar, and ordinary Abkhazians be squeezed out of the market. This issue has been on the agenda for decades but each time when the matter has been up for discussion, Abkhazian intransigence has carried the day, leaving the Russians increasingly irritated and frustrated.
However, recently, Russians seemed to have concluded that enough is enough: They began to ignore Abkhazian protests and pressed on to have it their way. The problem was not really Aslan Bzhania who was elected on a pro-Russian ticket and was regarded as reasonably pliant, but the opposition. In January 2022 it raised all the red flags when it found out that the Bzhania administration had agreed to transfer an attractive “state dacha” (a vacation resort complex) in Pitsunda on the northern sea shore to Russia. The issue was hotly debated in Abkhazia for almost two years, but it transpired that the dacha was intended for President Vladimir Putin’s personal use, so for Russians, cancellation of this agreement was out of question. In the end, the Abkhazian parliament was cowed into ratifying the deal, almost surreptitiously, in the early morning on 27 December 2023, before the demonstrators outside the building realized what was going on.
After the Pitsunda incident, the Abkhazian opposition suspected foul play and a sell-out to Russia behind virtually every government initiative. In summer 2024, the presidential administration prepared two bills, one on easing investment regulations for Russian capital in Abkhazia and another on arbitration in disputes between Abkhazian and Russian firms. The latter bill would oblige Abkhazian companies to accept verdicts in Russian courts. The Abkhazian parliamentarians passed this bill in September but voted down the bill on investments. In response Russia stopped paying salary supplements to Abkhazian teachers and doctors. Rumours also circulated that Moscow demanded to be given a list of all Abkhazian MPs who had voted against the investment bill, threatening to deprive them of their Russian citizenship. Abkhazia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Shamba did not deny the rumours but lamely remarked that “deprivation of citizenship is the prerogative of the Russian side.” This, unsurprisingly, created considerable commotion in Abkhazia. Russia did not act upon this threat, but later, after the storming of the parliament in November 2024, Russia did revoke the citizenship of two of the opposition leaders, Levan Mikaa and Kan Kvarchia. This punishment made it impossible for them to travel not only to Russia but anywhere outside Abkhazia.
Image: Protesters rally outside the parliament building in Sukhumi, November 2024 (Source: DNA News Abkhazia/Handout via Reuters)
In order to circumvent the ban on selling residential houses in Abkhazia to non-citizens, the government in a new legal initiative in July 2024 introduced a distinction between “apartments” and “apart-hotels.” Properties in the second category would be considered not residential but commercial real estate and therefore in free sale. The president argued that the law was needed to attract investments to the country and stimulate the economy.
When also this law was turned down by the parliamentarians, the legislation was reintroduced as a scheme to develop only the eastern part of the country, a depressed region which was attracting few tourists. With the Pitsunda sale in mind, the opposition was adamant that this time the bill should not pass. This led to violent confrontation between riot police and demonstrators. On 15 November, protesters forced their way into the parliament building which they occupied for four days, demanding not only that the bill should be rescinded but also that President Bzhania should be removed. Bzhania tendered his resignation on 19 November. Russia-Abkhazian relations had reached a nadir. Bzhania’s ouster was caused by his failure – as the Abkhazian opposition saw it – to stand up against Russian pressure, and Russia made no bones about their fury against the latest “revolution” in Sukhumi.
In December 2024, Russia failed to provide Abkhazia with additional electricity when the Inguri hydroelectric plant had to close down due to low water levels. In the cold winter months, Abkhazian consumers had only two hours of electricity per day. Also this was perceived as punishment for the refusal to pass the bill on investments.
Presidential elections 2025, first round
Bzhania’s removal from office necessitated snap elections which were set for 15 February 2025. Five candidates were registered, three of which were regarded as less serious: Robert Arshba, former head of the Abkhazian Audit Chamber; Oleg Bartsits, former Abkhazian trade representative in Moscow, and businessman Adgur Khurkhumal. The two real contenders were Bzhania’s vice president, 42-year-old Badra Gunba, and his coeval Adgur Ardzinba, leader of the Abkhazian Popular Movement, and a former minister of economy. Gunba appeared somewhat unimpressive as a candidate but enjoyed the support of the Russian patron. After Bzhania’s resignation he briefly served as acting president but then stepped down in order to run for the presidency.
Image: Candidates in Abkhazia’s 2025 presidential elections. Clockwise from top left: Adgur Ardzinba, Badra Gunba, Oleg Bartstits, Adgur Khurkhumal, and Robert Arshba (Source: Lily Samarine/OC Media)
Even if Gunba was now without any official position, he was nevertheless received in Russia as if he were already elected Abkhazian head of state. In Moscow he had meetings with both finance minister Anton Siluanov and foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, and promised that if elected, he would push for the adoption of the investment agreement which had been scuttled in December. In return, the Russians announced that they would restart the salary supplements for public sector employees in Abkhazia and also fully restore the region’s electricity supply. Gunba returned home from his “private” visit to Russia by plane, landing on the Sukhumi airport which had been renovated with Russian support but was not yet officially opened. Gunba could bring the glad tidings that the airport would start operating in May, something which would massively boost the tourist industry in the country. In the opposition, Gunba’s trip to Russia was widely denounced as facilitating illegal interference in the elections.
Adgur Ardzinba has the same last name as Abkhazia’s first president after independence, but is not related to him. The name coincidence was nevertheless regarded as an asset since Vladislav Ardzinba is fondly remembered in Abkhazia. In Russian media, however, Adgur Ardzinba was vilified as a Turkish stooge, on the basis that he had studied in Turkey and often travelled there. Back in November, he had played an active role in the storming of the parliament, apparently a more crucial one than the two individuals who had been deprived of their Russian citizenship. For Russia, Ardzinba was a bête noire who had to be stopped.
There are no independent survey institutes in Abkhazia but pollsters in Russia conducted research which allegedly showed that Gunba was way ahead of all the other candidates, with more than 30% support against 15% for his closest challenger, Ardzinba. The Abkhazian Central Election Commission (CEC) branded the poll as an illegal attempt to influence the voters, while in Russia the Abkhazian CEC was regarded as not impartial but as acting in cahoots with Ardzinba.
The Abkhazian CEC got embroiled in a number of disputes with Russian authorities. A record number of Russian observers – more than 200 – wanted to cover the elections, and Russians became suspicious when confirmation of their accreditation was delayed. Further, Russian authorities requested 7000 ballots for Abkhazian citizens living in Russia, far more than for any other previous election. The Abkhazian authorities clearly feared that the surplus ballots could be misused for ballot stuffing. In the end, a compromise number of 4000 was agreed upon.
Russian media wholeheartedly supported Gunba while most media outside Russia which covered the elections, such as Ekho Kavkaza, Meduza and Abkhazian World, were sympathetic towards Ardzinba. Ekho Kavkaza, a website run by the US-funded Radio Svoboda, reprinted articles by Izida Chania, editor of Nuzhnaya gazeta, an Internet paper which for all practical purposes functioned as a mouthpiece of the opposition.
On the eve of the first round of the elections Chania discussed what awaited Abkhazia if Gunba won. She expected support for foreign oligarchy and the destruction of Abkhazian business; multiple price hikes for essential goods. [Former Prime Minister Alexander] Ankvab’s decree on increasing customs duties (now temporarily suspended by the decree of Acting President Valery Bganba) will come into force. Increases in electricity tariffs, sale of the energy sector and increased prices for virtually everything. Demographic catastrophe – a return of the topic of apartments, and sale of real estate to foreigners. Sale of state assets – agreement on privileges for foreign investors. Persecution of dissidents, of the opposition, public activists, and people in the non-governmental sector. Corruption, further usurpation of power.
This doomsday scenario, however, did not sway the electorate. Gunba won the first round with a clear margin, 46.4% against Adgur Ardzinba’s 36.9%. Robert Arshba got 7.6%, Oleg Bartsits – 4 % and Adgur Khurkhumal, less than 1%. However, since the winner had received less than 50% of the vote, a second round between the two front-runners was arranged on 1 March.
The 2025 elections, second round
In the two weeks between the first and the second round of the elections, tensions and mistrust between the two camps continued to grow. Ardzinba announced that foreign armed groups, whom he suspected of being members of a private military company, had been observed in Abkhazia. Fearing provocations and bloodshed, he demanded that they should be deported.
There were also reports about foul play. The official newspaper of the Russian government, Rossiisskaia Gazeta, claimed that in the first round of the elections, acting president Valery Bganba had been colluding with Ardzinba, and “effectively acted on his instructions.” Allegedly, Bganba had “deliberately taken steps that could destabilize the situation in the country.” Abkhazian pro-opposition media on the other hand complained that the Kremlin continued, “contrary to all the rules, to support one of the candidates for the presidency of Abkhazia.”
The results from the first round had shown that in villages with a high share of ethnic Armenian voters, support for Gunba was particularly high, and the Ardzinba team surmised that Armenians could have been exposed to pressure or bribery. An audio file appeared on a Telegram channel in which the nephew of the interim president allegedly threatened the Armenians with revenge. He insisted that “for the second round [of elections] we must draw very strong conclusions, including about the Armenians. Also some Abkhazians let us down in many places, but the Armenians… We have to scare them…”. In response, the head of the Russian Investigative Committee, Aleksandr Bastrykin, announced that his agency would look into the possible danger which “Russian citizens” were exposed to in Abkhazia.
In an attempt to calm passions, front runner Gunba on 21 February proposed that the two opponents should sign a “truce,” an agreement that both would respect “civilized rules”: They should refrain from employing “black PR,” insulting each other, and levelling accusations against the opponent of pursuing a “policy against the interests of the people” or “betraying their homeland.” They should also denounce any attempt to foment ethnic strife, a rather transparent reference to the above-mentioned Telegram post.
This proposal was accepted by Ardzinba, but no sooner had the agreement been signed before the candidates began to accuse each other of breaking it. The Central Election Committee warned Gunba against misusing “administrative resources,” referring to how Russian ministers and heads of federal departments travelled to Abkhazia and in Gunba’s presence presented the republic with various gifts – from school textbooks to ambulances. However, veteran political observer Natella Akaba concluded that nothing untoward had happened – she had not observed any administrative resources being used to promote the campaign of either candidate. “Both are free to advertise their message. And I’m not able to predict who is more successful.”
In the upshot, the candidate supported by Russia carried the day: Gunba garnered 55% of the vote and Ardzinba 42%. Turnout was 69%. While the opposition complained about “the dirtiest pre-election campaign in the entire post-independence period,” they did not challenge the result; the difference in support for the two candidates was too large for any recount to lead to another outcome.
The way ahead
The 2025 presidential elections may well signal a watershed in Russian–Abkhazian relations. This was the first time in two decades Russia so openly supported one of the candidates. In 2004, the Russians had pushed hard to get Raul Khadjimba elected. That time it seemed that the voters reacted negatively against the patron’s meddling, and it was widely assumed that some voted in favour of Khadjimba’s opponent Sergei Bagapsh precisely because he was expected to be more independent of Moscow. Before the first round of the 2025 elections, Izida Chania in Nuzhnaya gazeta had predicted that the same could happen also this time, but it did not.
In 2025, Moscow’s strong pressure paid off, even if the voters had reason to assume that a long-term effect of Gunba’s win could be an increased role for the Kremlin in Abkhazian politics and society. One difference from 2004 was that this time around Moscow not only cajoled and threatened but also followed up the threats with action, such as depriving self-willed politicians of Russian citizenship and putting on hold salary supplements for state employees. In the future, it might not be necessary for Russia to wield such sharp weapons to keep Abkhazia under its heel, it could be enough that the Abkhazians know that the Russians have these weapons in their arsenal and are willing to use them.
When Russia engaged so actively in the Abkhazian elections in 2025, it was probably not because they so desperately wanted to see Badra Gunba as the next president. It was far more important for them to stop his opponent, Adgur Ardzinba, who was unacceptable to Moscow. Uncharismatic Gunba is likely to be amenable to Russian pressure. Some observers have also speculated that he, as Aslan Bzhania’s former vice president, might come to play a role similar to what Dmitry Medvedev did in Putin’s “tandem,” as a weak figurehead. Gunba’s former boss, they speculate, might play an active role in the shadows, or possibly as prime minister. And behind Bzhania, again, further into the shadows, we might discern the silhouette of the Kremlin’s curator for Abkhazia, Sergei Kirienko.
Author: Pål Kolstø
