Russia-instigated Energy Crisis in Transnistria and False Hopes for the Region’s Quick Reintegration within Moldova
Background
The ongoing energy crisis in the Republic of Moldova, following Ukraine’s decision to stop the transit of Russian gas to the EU after 1 January 2025, has particularly affected the Russian proxy in Moldova – the Transnistrian region. Moldovan authorities have considerably reduced the country’s dependence on Russian natural gas, in response to a Russian attempt in late 2021 to put political pressure on the newly elected pro-European parliamentary majority in Moldova. However, the Moldovan government was unable to implement similar risk-mitigation measures on the Transnistrian region’s territory. The reason is simple. Even though the region is internationally recognized as part of the Republic of Moldova, it has been governed by the Russian Federation backed secessionists since the early 1990s, which according to some accounts can be seen as military occupation.
To avoid a humanitarian crisis in the Transnistrian region during the winter season, Moldova requested Russia to continue delivering natural gas according to the existing contract. In response, the Russian authorities suggested that Moldova should first convince Ukraine to maintain the transit, and consequently also refused to use alternative routes to supply natural gas to Transnistria. This created the impression that Russia had abandoned its proxy regime in Transnistria or at least did not seem to attach as much importance as before to maintaining its political control over the region. Consequently, some voices suggested that this hardship confronting the Transnistrian region due to Moscow distancing itself from the problem could weaken the Russian influence in the region. Moreover, the crisis is also scarcely viewed as presenting a potential opportunity for Moldova to reintegrate the region by recovering its political and administrative control over that territory.
Image: Moldovan President Maia Sandu (left) and Prime Minister Dorin Recean (Source: Eurostiri.ro)
The views inside Moldova’s leadership circle are somewhat less optimistic, questioning the feasibility of reintegration at this stage, mostly due to the unfavorable geopolitical situation and “strong Russian positions”. The Moldovan Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, Oleg Serebrean, acknowledged that the Russian refusal to continue exporting natural gas to Transnistria would weaken the region’s dependence on Russia, which in turn could create stronger opportunities for the country’s reintegration. In his public remarks in early January, which he echoed during his recent visit to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean was more cautious and nuanced. He reiterated Moldova’s intention to reintegrate the region “via peaceful means,” but emphasized that the key condition for this scenario is the withdrawal of the Russian military forces from the region, which will make it possible to govern the region properly.
There seems to be a consensus in the government about the critical role that the Russian military plays in maintaining Moscow’s effective control over the region, even offsetting the economic factors. President Maia Sandu has also repeatedly stressed the need for the Russian military forces in Transnistria to be replaced by an international peacekeeping mission under the umbrella of the UN or EU. She recently confirmed that demand, also describing the withdrawal of Russian military forces as a condition for Chisinau’s support to the region in addressing the consequences of the ongoing energy crisis.
The logic of territorial control
The imperative of territorial control has historically been the fundamental criterion determining state formation, as well as the ability of the central government to govern by enforcing the laws. In practice, this has been achieved via the ability of the state to maintain the monopoly over the legitimate use of force on the territory which it sought to control. This allows governments to maintain order, provide an uninterrupted supply of public services, collect taxes, and conduct elections (either free or controlled) to claim their legitimacy. It is this set of particular conditions that arguably justifies the famous Charles Tilly’s statement that “war made the state and the state made war.”
This logic is also key to Moldova reintegrating the Transnistrian region successfully without losing its sovereignty. It also explains why the pretended federalization that Russia has been trying to impose on the Republic of Moldova – a model of Transnistria’s reintegration in which the region remains de facto under the Russian political (and military) control, while acquiring asymmetrically to its population and territory ability to veto Moldovan domestic and foreign policies – would preserve the region as a Russian proxy agent, only with additional legitimization in the eyes of the international community.
Therefore, the continuous statements by the top political leaders of Moldova that the critical condition for reintegration is the withdrawal of the Russian military forces (all of them) is a refreshing and significant change in Moldova’s strategic culture. Arguably, this should be the first time in Moldova’s post-Soviet history when its political leadership had clearly understood the central impasse staying in the way of recovering the region effectively. However, the challenge remains that Moldova’s authorities do not consider actively addressing this obstacle, instead opting for a wait-and-see approach. If this continues, the anticipated reintegration might occur decades later, but only when a future Russian government chooses to voluntarily relinquish political control over the region and withdraw from it.
The role of Russian forces in the region
To be reasonable, the solution to this problem is very difficult and risky, as the set of strategies available to Moldova is either coercing Russia to withdraw its troops or using brute force against them. The use of brute force is technically the easiest solution, according to the specialized literature, as it does not require Russia’s cooperation. Moldova could do that by its own means or by enlisting Ukraine’s assistance – a country in a state of active war with Russia – which has a legitimate interest in removing this Russian military presence in its strategic rear.
Using its own forces requires a considerable investment in strengthening Moldova’s Armed Forces and involves some significant risks of triggering a Russian military response, similar to Russia’s attack on Georgia in 2008. In fact, the Russian authorities seem to be quite concerned that Moldova might contemplate this scenario, as since 2022, various top Russian officials have repeatedly warned Moldova against it by threatening retaliation.
The Russian concerns are not unwarranted. If Moldova should use brute force to reintegrate the region, this is the most appropriate time. In contrast to Georgia, Moldova does not have a common border with Russia. This significantly hinders Russian ability to reinforce its forces in Transnistria or react before Moldova establishes a new status quo in the region. Ukraine, being in a state of active war with Russia, will not allow the use of its territory for the movement of Russian forces to Transnistria and, in fact, even has a strong interest in attacking the Russian troops in the region. Moreover, Russia is viewed as an aggressor state due to its invasion of Ukraine, and the international community will largely (even if passively) side with Moldova in such a scenario.
Image: Russian and Transnistrian regime soldiers marching on May 9 parade (Source: BalkanInsight)
While Western analysts view the size of Russian forces in the Transnistrian region as being militarily insignificant, in relative terms, they are a force to be reckoned with. The data on the Russian presence in Moldova is inaccurate, but there seems to be a general consensus that Russia has an active combat force of 1,500 – 2,000 troops stationed in Transnistria under various disguises. Given the comparable size of the Moldovan National Army (reportedly over 3,000), Moldova has a real chance for victory. In my assessment, this is primarily because the local population is unlikely to genuinely mobilize to fight against Moldovan forces and will instead adopt a passive waiting stance.
Despite this, the Moldovan government does not contemplate this scenario even remotely. There are different reasons for this. First, the strategic culture of Moldova’s ruling elites is rudimentary, involving a poor understanding of the role of military force as a tool of statecraft and the lack of resolve to use it. Secondly, Moldovan authorities have been very ineffective in dealing with the effects of Russian foreign interference in various areas, including social, economic, and political. Today, Moldova has one of the most divided societies in its post-Soviet history, as revealed by the recent presidential elections in November 2024. Even though the pro-European candidate Maia Sandu won the elections, she lost the popular vote inside the country as the win was brought preponderantly by the Moldovan voters abroad. This internally precarious situation poses significant dangers (though not impossible to mitigate) to the government if it decides to embark on risky policies such as using military force in Transnistria. Finally, even though the size of the Russian forces in Transnistria is relatively small, it has – in the eyes of the Moldovan leadership – a considerable deterrent effect due to its trip-wire logic that deterrence by punishment strategy brings. An attack that could result in casualties among the Russian troops will be qualified in Moscow as an attack against Russia and could potentially trigger the use of long-range strikes against Moldova.
Image: Transnistrian Committee for State Security (KGB) troops in training (Source: Novostipmr.com)
Therefore, even though using brute force is an effective albeit risky strategy to deal with Russian control over Transnistria, the Moldovan authorities do not consider it. This leaves the alternative approach, which is using coercion– a strategy that requires Russia’s cooperation. Specifically, this would be coercion by compellence, which, according to Thomas Schelling is a threat aiming to make an adversary do one’s bidding. Practically, this manifests through coercive diplomacy and would only be possible if Moldova manages to mobilize the support of its Western partners.
To enact this policy, Moldovan authorities would need to be able to effectively build at least a small coalition of the willing that would be powerful enough to use the European institutions to place military, political, and economic pressure on the region. That would require actions threatening the survival of the regime in Transnistria as well as the ability of the Russian forces to operate properly. This is highly unlikely to happen, including due to the fact that this pressure will significantly affect the local inhabitants and thus will not attract sufficient support in the West for ethical reasons.
Furthermore, from the very start, the Transnistrian conflict was treated in the West as inter-ethnic. There were two reasons behind this. First, the break-up of Yugoslavia and the consequent inter-ethnic conflicts affecting its political entities created both the example and the expectations in the West that the dissolution of the USSR should produce similar consequences. Secondly, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the West had a largely positive attitude towards Russia both for the sake of encouraging democratic reforms but also being concerned about the negative effects of violent conflicts in the post-Soviet area. Unsurprisingly, Russian military actions in Armenia, Georgia and Moldova in the early 1990s were viewed almost as the provision of an international public good in the form of regional security and stability.
This has determined the EU and US to support the Russian “peacekeeping” model, which in practice legitimized Russian military presence in Transnistria, allowing Moscow to control the negotiations as a “mediator” with veto powers. The “peacekeeping” model Russia established in Transnistria is conceptually similar to the model enacted by Russia in Ukraine starting in 2014, with the help of the Minsk agreements. That legacy exists even today, as the Transnistrian conflict is not viewed as an act of aggression, similar to the Russian proxy war in Ukraine’s Donbas in 2014.
The role of identity and ideology
Earlier, this analysis claimed that the inhabitants of the Transnistrian region would not resist violently to a potential military operation of the government of Moldova and instead would take a passive waiting approach. There are two explanations behind this claim. First, despite the efforts of the Russian propagandists invoking the identity of “Pridnestrovian people” and a Soviet ideology driving the secessionist efforts of the region, the real driver was Moscow’s instrumentalization of fear. If we examine the news from the late 1980s and early 1990s, we can see that the leading rhetoric used to mobilize anti-Moldovan spirits on the left bank of the Nistru River (where the majority of the Transnistrian region is situated) was the threat that “Romanian fascists” will come along and enslave the Russian speakers. Today, this is not credible anymore. In fact, Transnistria residents have made tremendous efforts to obtain Romanian citizenship. While it is unclear how many of them have Romanian passports, the Moldovan authorities confirmed that as of April 2023, some 350,000 of the region’s over 375,000 inhabitants were Moldovan citizens. The two riverbanks’ economic activities and labor markets are also quite interconnected, mostly with Transnistrian inhabitants traveling regularly to the areas under the control of Chisinau. This is just some of the evidence confirming that the fear factor used by Russia in the attempt to build a local identity does not exist anymore or has been tremendously weakened.
The second reason is related to the widespread mercantilist behavior. Economic well-being is the top priority of a predominant segment of the population, which is becoming increasingly apolitical. In fact, this also explains the increasing division in Moldova’s elections, as many who vote against pro-European parties do so due to their political indifference and short-term economic benefits offered by the Russian political proxies. Because these population groups are quite poor, these small benefits are perceived as relatively considerable.
Image: A regime-organized protest in Transnistria against Moldovan authorities (Source: RIA Novosti)
A recent incident in the Copanca village, situated in the Security Zone but under the control of Moldovan authorities, is very illustrative. Following the ongoing energy crisis, the Moldovan authorities are making efforts to connect a few villages that used to get their electricity from the Transnistrian region, including Copanca, to the energy providers of the right bank. Because the energy coming from the Transnistrian region, under heavy subsidization of the Russian government, is comparatively cheaper, a group of inhabitants mobilized to protest against this initiative of the Moldovan government. They even called for their village to go under the administration of the Transnistrian regime, although there were reports that this protest was staged by pro-Russian proxies.
Economic enticement
Given these developments and the prevalence of mercantilist tendencies over ideological considerations (Russia vs the EU/West), one could argue that the strategy of gradual enticement with economic benefits should allow for the region’s reintegration into Moldova. This approach would be a viable one if the region were democratically governed. This would put pressure on the region’s administration, which would transform into its stronger openness towards genuine negotiations with the Moldovan authorities. The governance regime in Transnistria is authoritarian with totalitarian elements, being rather similar to Russia. Therefore, the population has little incentive to risk persecution for rallying against the authorities unless the cost of the revolt is lower than the cost of inaction. Given the coercive capacity of the Russian proxy regime in Transnistria, the population that disagrees uses the exit strategy, leaving the region. Unless the living conditions worsen significantly, the population will not openly voice their discontent, which is why Russia has continued to subsidize the region via cheap energy, pensions and “social” projects.
In fact, about 70% of the Transnistrian budget has reportedly been funded by Russia, making the region’s survival unsustainable without Russian money. This is why even though Russia refused to supply natural gas to Moldova via alternative routes after 1 January 2025, risking to affect its influence and political control in Transnistria, it quickly offered to pay for the region’s energy costs. Following the Moldovan authorities’ proposal to provide natural gas to Transnistria with the assistance of the EU, the separatist region’s leader Vadim Krasnoselsky went to Moscow, meeting with Russian officials and requesting “humanitarian” assistance, in a political show for the region’s inhabitants. The objective was to strengthen the image of Russia as a “savior” of the region and justify the refusal of European Union assistance. Russian authorities have reportedly offered to cover the cost of natural gas for Transnistria until April (about $164 million), to be purchased and delivered by third parties.
Image: A crossing point at Moldova’s administrative border with the Transnistrian region (Source: Daniel Mihailescu/AFP)
Besides the regime type, the second obstacle is the dynamic of the patron-client relationship between Moscow and its political proxy in Transnistria. Russia continues to maintain significant coercive capacities in the region in the form of its military forces, as well as various presences in the security services of the Transnistrian separatist authorities. Therefore, even if hypothetically there was an opening among the region’s leadership to negotiate with the Moldovan authorities in good faith and allow for the region’s reintegration into Moldova, Russia would quickly arrest and sanction these individuals. A strong deterrence for the local leaders going against the Kremlin is also the series of mysterious deathsover the last years involving various prominent Russians who had disagreements with the regime. Altogether, these factors significantly diminished the agency of the Transnistrian regime, making it a de facto branch of the Russian government on the Moldovan territory.
Prospects for the region’s reintegration
The model of an evolutionary resolution of the conflict that the Moldovan authorities and their Western partners seem to pursue is thus unfeasible. The expectation that the “resistance” of the Transnistrian ruling elites, operating under the Russian military and security services’ protection, will gradually erode is unrealistic. The related hope to attract the region’s population through relatively higher economic benefits is also a pipe dream. Any viable strategy for Transnistrian region reintegration has to address the imperative of territorial control and the ability to enforce the rules in the region through the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. The current energy crisis does indeed provide opportunities to recover control over Transnistria, but only if the Moldovan authorities manage to derive a strategy that effectively addresses the key obstacle for reintegration and can rally its Western partners behind it.
Author: Dumitru Minzarari
