Russia Tightens its Grip Over South Ossetia
In the eyes of many international observers, South Ossetia, a de facto independent state in northern Georgia, has moved one step closer to being annexed by the Russian Federation. On 9 May 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and South Ossetia’s de facto President Alan Gagloev, met in the Kremlin to sign the “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction”.
Image: Gagloev and Putin meet to sign the “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction (Source: kremlin.ru)
The new agreement essentially facilitates South Ossetia’s integration into the Russian Federation. Upon signing the treaty, South Ossetia’s de facto leadership committed to gradually aligning its legislation, including civil, tax, labor, and social service laws, with Russia’s. Both sides also committed to pursuing unified foreign and defense policies, jointly developing infrastructure, energy, and agricultural projects, and expanding educational cooperation.
Unsurprisingly, the agreement has been slammed by the Georgian government in Tbilisi, which recognises South Ossetia as part of its sovereign territory. That position is supported by almost the entire international community, with the exception of Russia and a few of Moscow’s closest allies.
During a session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, held just a few days after the signing of the treaty, Maka Botchorishvili, Georgia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, called the agreement “a further step towards annexation”. Similarly, when commenting on the agreement, Tamta Mikeladze, from Georgia’s Social Justice Centre, bluntly stated “we are witnessing a genuinely catastrophic push towards annexation in Tskhinvali”.
The agreement has also been condemned from Georgia’s western partners, despite the fact relations between Tbilisi and Brussels have become increasingly strained over the past few years. The Foreign Ministries of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, issued a joint statement condemning the agreement, and echoing Georgia’s claim that Russia is attempting to absorb South Ossetia.
In South Ossetia, the agreement is unlikely to cause any controversy amongst the general populace, even if it is part of Moscow’s plan to eventually absorb the region. Unlike Georgia’s other secessionist region, Abkhazia, the South Ossetians have never sought complete independence. Instead, they have consistently strived for integration into the Russian Federation, and unification Russia’s North Ossetian Republic. Upon signing the agreement, Gagloev claimed it was a necessary step towards the “future unification of the Ossetian people”.
However, while the agreement may appeal to broad sections of the South Ossetian public, it may ruffle some feathers amongst the de facto state’s political elite, who might now find themselves overlooked in favour of outsiders appointed directly by the Kremlin.
Article two of the states that residency in one country, is the equivalent of residency in another. In effect, this provision waves the standard residency and citizenship requirements for citizens to hold official positions. Prior to the signing of the agreement, someone wishing to become South Ossetia’s de facto president or prime minister, needed to reside in the region ten years prior to their appointment. However, now, in theory, anyone from the Russian Federation can apply for either position, provided they satisfy the necessary language requirements. The Kremlin has wasted little time in exploiting this provision, ensuring that its preferred candidate takes control of the de facto state’s top political office.
South Ossetia’s new leader
On 27 May 2026, Marat Kambolov was appointed “state advisor to the President of South Ossetia”. Kambolov is an ethnic Ossetian, born in North Ossetia. However, he as virtually unknown in South Ossetia, having no direct connections with the de facto state, and having spent most of his career in Moscow. On paper, Kambolov was just there to implement the Moscow-Tskhinvali treaty. In reality, the Kremlin had far bigger plans for him.
On 8 June 2026, South Ossetia’s de facto Prime Minister, Dzambolat Tadtaev, abruptly submitted his resignation, citing “personal reasons”. Without question, Gagloev accepted Tadtaev’s resignation, and announced that Kambolov, who was not officially part of any South Ossetian political party, would become the new prime minster.
On 22 June 2026, Gagloev announced his own resignation, stating that he was to become an advisor to President Putin concerning the implementation of the “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction”. As luck would have it, according to the South Ossetian constitution, if the president is unable to complete their term, the Prime Minister will serve as acting president, until new elections are held.
Unsurprisingly, Kambolov’s rapid rise to power was no fluke. Instead, it is part of a calculated move by Moscow to tighten its grip on the region.
In late-May, Jimsher Rekhviashvili, published an article for Radio Free Europe Georgia, claiming that the Kremlin where viewed Kambolov as a potential replacement for Gagloev. However, Rekhviashvili did not envisage the change occurring so rapidly, and instead suggested that the plan was likely for Kambolov to participate in the next presidential elections, which were scheduled for 2027. Yet Russia chose to fast-track Kambolov to the top, clearly determined to put a trusted insider in charge.
Image: Kambolov and Gagloev (Source: civil.ge/archives)
Why Moscow tightened its grasp
South Ossetia’s existence is completely dependent on Russia. The Kremlin subsidises upwards of ninety percent of the de facto state’s annual budget and monitors the de facto states border with Georgia. The South Ossetian armed forces have been formally integrated into the Russian Army. The region’s de facto Minister of Defence, Yuri Yarovitsky, was a former tank commander in the Russian Army.
However, it appears that Moscow has grown frustrated with the region’s political elite. Since Gagloev assumed office, factional conflicts have run rife, crime has risen, and corruption has proliferated. Gagloev was accused of illegally seizing businesses of his rivals, while at the beginning of the year the entire cabinet of ministers was dismissed for misappropriating $39 million dollars. On the streets of Tskhinvali, petty crime was becoming an everyday occurrence.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, throwing more money at South Ossetia was not the answer. Gagloev, and the rest of South Ossetia’s political elite were weak, divided, and untrustworthy. To ensure a return on their investment, Moscow wanted to appoint someone they could trust as leader of the self-proclaimed state.
From the Kremlin’s perspective, Kambolov had several qualities that made him the perfect candidate for the job. Kambolov was born in North Ossetia and has close political ties to the region. However, he is not well known in South Ossetia, meaning that he sits above the factional disputes that have plagued the region. Kambolov may lack local ties, but Moscow clearly believes its backing will give him all the clout he needs.
Kambolov is also well respected and connected within Russia. His background at the Kurchatov Institute, a hub for state-backed megaprojects in Russia, gives him the technical expertise to execute the infrastructure upgrades needed to modernize South Ossetia.
Beyond his technical background, Kambolov is deeply plugged into Russia’s power structure through his ties to Putin-insiders Yury and Mikhail Kovalchuk, as well as Deputy Chief of Staff Sergei Kiriyenko.
Moscow’s decision to install its own man in South Ossetia was also shaped by recent instability in Abkhazia. In late 2024, anger over an agreement favouring Russian investors culminated in protesters seizing official buildings and ousting the president. While the movement was not anti-Russian, the sudden loss of control spooked the Kremlin enough to respond with targeted economic sanctions.
A man of action
Since taking office, Marat Kambolov has worked hard to project the image of a hands-on leader. On his first full day in charge, he made a surprise inspection of the Nizhny Zaramag checkpoint on the border with Russia’s North Ossetia, speaking directly with stranded travellers and pledging to fix the chronic border delays.
Several weeks later, three new lanes were opened at the checkpoint, and “new technology” was installed which will supposedly reduce wait times. During the ceremony to celebrate the renovation of the border crossing, Kambolov told media outlets “for us, this is more than just a checkpoint. It’s a road that connects the North and the South, families and loved ones”.
Image: Kambolov at the Nizhny Zaramag checkpoint (Source: rsogov.org/news).
Kambolov has also targeted the region’s chronic wage and pension backlogs. Meeting with workers and retirees who haven’t been paid in months, he adopted a simple, crowd-pleasing slogan: “People who earned the money should receive it.” Beyond promising immediate payouts, he has called for structural reforms to prevent future delays.
Beyond economic relief, Kambolov has zeroed in on the sensitive Leningor (Akhalgori) district, home to a large ethnic Georgian population. In a gesture toward locals, he instructed South Ossetia’s KGB to explore humanitarian passes allowing residents to cross the de facto border for family visits and medical care. He also promised to spur tourism by converting an abandoned school into a hotel, while demonstrating his knack for quick wins: the district hospital received a new ambulance just 24 hours after his visit.
Local media reports also highlight how Kambolov leverages his Moscow connections to improve the lives of ordinary South Ossetians. Since becoming Acting President, he has signed a strategic cooperation deal with St. Petersburg, met top Russian officials, and secured 100 million rubles from the Presidential Grants Foundation for local non-profits.
What’s next?
In practice, the “Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction” removes the final barrier to direct Russian rule. South Ossetia was already overwhelmingly reliant on Moscow, but leadership still required a local face. With that unwritten rule discarded, Kambolov’s rise demonstrates that the Kremlin can now appoint external technocrats to the de facto state’s top position.
Outright annexation remains off the table for now. With its resources tied up in Ukraine and total authority already secured on the ground, Russia has little incentive to absorb the unnecessary geopolitical fallout that such a move would entail.
Kambolov’s transition from acting president to full-term leader looks inevitable ahead of the September 18 vote. Even if all six candidate applications currently under review are approved, his Kremlin endorsement and track record of quick administrative wins give him an unassailable edge.
In Kambolov, Moscow has found the ideal formula for South Ossetia: an effective technocrat who delivers local results while keeping Tskhinvali on a tight Kremlin leash. His likely victory this September won’t just confirm a new president, it will formalise direct Russian administration over the territory.
Author: Dr. Keith Harrington
